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Introduction  
Terrorism is recognized as one of today's biggest threats to international security, peace and 
development (Rapoport, 2011; UNSC, 2014) and as the “greatest test” of modern conflict 
resolution strategies (Miall et al., 2016, p. 333). While the world has seen a global increase in 
terrorism, its intensity and spread over the past decades; reaching its peak in 2014 in number 
of fatalities (IEP, 2017; 2019), the multitude of consequences generated by terror 
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Abstract 
This study seeks to contribute to filling the prevailing research deficit in empirical data 
informed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) and their experiences of, and challenges in, 
reintegration, through qualitative interviews with returning FTFs in Kwale County, Kenya; 
a county producing a relative majority of Kenyan recruits to Al Shabaab, who are offered 
amnesty upon return to their county of origin. The Life Psychology framework, which 
assumes an inherent human strive to obtain a good life, i.e. life embeddedness, is adopted 
for the analysis. The study finds that returnees commit to reintegration in the absence of 
other alternatives, due to economic incentives and longing for acceptance. It confirms that 
the process requires the societal motivation in facilitation, but will fail without the sustained 
commitment of the returning FTF. The study further establishes that returning FTFs are not 
able to obtain a flow in life embeddedness, which would indicate inability to reintegrate. 
Yet, many of the interviewed returning FTFs express the contrary, which challenges the 
concept of life embeddedness as an indicator for reintegration. The study further challenges 
the general assumption that deradicalization is a precondition for reintegration, as it finds 
that radicalized individuals are able to reintegrate into communities of origin without 
deserting held radical beliefs, if those communities share radical sentiments. 
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organizations are transnational and include death, fear and migration (Miall et al., 2016; 
UNGA, 2015). The migratory ways are recognized in two directions; one paved by civilians 
fleeing conflict affected territory to seek refuge and the other by those who are attracted to 
join the fight (UNGA, 2015), i.e. Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). Parallel to persistent 
recruitment, reports of disengaging FTFs continue to proliferate (IEP, 2017; Koehler, 2016; 
Marsden, 2017; RAN, 2016; 2017). These disengaging recruits establish a third path in the 
migratory movement, as they return to their countries of origin. The return of FTFs constitute, 
beyond the numerous security threats unless addressed appropriately, significant potential in 
countering violent extremism (CVE) which urgently needs to be utilized. 
 
Research Problem 
The return of FTFs is not a new phenomenon, but its gained momentum in the global 
scholarly discourse can be attributed to advancement in detecting, disrupting and prosecuting 
terrorism activity as well as partial success of military offences resulting in battlefield loss or 
defeat of certain terrorist organizations (IEP, 2017; 2019; RAN, 2017). As ISIL, Boko Haram, 
Al Shabaab and others are pushed to retreat, the expectedly increased number of returning 
FTFs to societies of origin demands the development of comprehensive strategies for the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of FTFs as a prioritized item on the security agenda. 
 Reintegrating returning FTFs is argued to be the sole solution to the potential threats 
returnees pose to public safety (Clubb, 2016; Holmer and Shtuni, 2017; Marsden, 2017), 
which requires the societal motivation of receiving communities to facilitate the process as 
well as the commitment of the returning FTF (Bertelsen, 2015; IEP, 2017; Koehler, 2016; 
Marsden, 2017; Noor and Halabi, 2018). The returnee undergoes a continuous behavioral and 
cognitive process which risks, at high costs, being challenged and interrupted by internal and 
external factors (Khalil et al., 2019; Marsden, 2017). The risks can be averted if developed 
strategies are informed by returnees’ experiences from practice (Horgan, 2009; Koehler, 
2016; Marsden, 2017; Tapley and Clubb, 2019). Yet, the practice of reintegration of FTFs 
remains relatively undertheorized (Noricks, 2009; Koehler, 2016) as limited empirical 
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evidence is available concerning the reintegration process from a returning FTFs perspective. 
The deficit is argued to be a result of scholarly preoccupation with developing theories and 
preventive measures for radicalization (Altier et al., 2014; Horgan, 2009; Noricks, 2009). The 
reintegration imperative, simultaneous to theorization of radicalization, begs for further 
theoretical and empirical evidence which can only be provided through research capturing the 
experience of returnees and the essence of the reintegration process: the returnees sustained 
commitment to reintegration (Koehler, 2016; Marsden, 2017). 
 Kenya is substantially affected by terrorism and ranked at position 22 (IEP, 2017) and 
21 (IEP, 2019) of 163 countries surveyed on impact of terrorism in the Global Terrorism 
Index (GTI), arguably due to the geographic proximity to Somalia where the al-Qaida 
affiliated terror group Al Shabaab seeks to create an Islamic State (ICG, 2014; Rapoport, 
2011). Numerous fatal attacks have been carried out on Kenyan soil, targeting civilians, 
security forces and foreign targets through sieges, hijackings, public beheadings, and 
massacres in educational, commercial and other public facilities (Al Jazeera, 2020; Guardian, 
2017; ICG, 2014). The GTI uses four indicators to measure the impact of terrorism: number 
of casualties, injuries, incidents and damage due to terrorism (IEP, 2017; 2019), but does not 
account for the number of Kenyan FTFs participating in the Salafi-jihad in Somalia. The 
recruited Kenyan youth, driven by real as well as perceived socio-economic and religious-
political grievances (RoK, 2017), account for 25 per cent of the estimated 7000 Al Shabaab 
members (Cannon and Pkalya, 2017). 
Following the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) deployed with the African Union Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2011 to fight back the Islamic Court regime (ICG, 2014; Miall et 
al., 2016), the third migratory flow caused by terrorism has emerged with new vigor. 
Intentions of the returning FTFs range from retaliation and continued recruitment to hiding 
and reintegration (Kenya Gazette, 2017; RoK, 2017). The Government of Kenya (GoK) 
criminalizes all acts of terrorism as well as affiliation with the same while, since 2014, 
offering an amnesty to FTFs with the objective to incite disengagement (Kenya Law, 2015; 
NCTC, 2016; Ombati, 2015). Following the announcement of amnesty, which scholarly 
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consensus generally note to advance only already considered disengagement (Altier et al., 
2014), the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) recognized “hundreds 
of Kenyans leaving the ranks” of Al Shabaab (NCTC, 2016, p. 26); an increasing number of 
these returning to Kwale (RoK, 2017). 
The Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism (KCPCVE), launched in 
February 2017 and aligned with the NSCVE, includes aspects of local rehabilitation and 
reintegration initiatives of returning FTFs. Formal and informal strategies are developed and 
implemented for enhancing reintegration, while engaged returnees face multiple challenges in 
sustaining commitment due to stigmatization, legal challenges, extrajudicial violence, 
harassment, retaliation from former comrades and interaction with the receiving communities 
where far from all are supportive (ICG, 2014; RoK, 2017). Hence, Kwale presents an 
opportunity for theorizing the experienced commitment of returnees, what challenges are 
faced in the process and how these are addressed. 
 
Relevance 
The reintegration of returnees has long been argued to present the most effective 
opportunity to practice counterterrorism (Horgan, 2008). If the rising number of FTFs is not 
appropriately addressed, it will pose a direct and latent security threat to receiving 
communities with the potential to cause severe consequences in aggravating violent 
extremism (Jawaid, 2017; RAN, 2016; 2017; RoK, 2017). 
The practice of reintegration needs to be informed by returnees and it is argued that 
“former terrorists are willing to speak about their experiences if one asks the correct 
questions” (Horgan, 2009, p. 293, emphasis by author). As much as FTFs compose a 
heterogeneous group and returnees are not representative of those who remain with a terrorist 
organization, it is argued that answers to questions of “why” and “how” (Altier et al., 2014, p. 
648) can inform processes of disengagement and reintegration. This study contributes to the 
deficient evidence-based literature on accounts of experiences in reintegration, which serves 
to inform future development of strategies in Kwale and elsewhere while strengthening 
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political will in implementing programmes. Furthermore, the findings will complement the 
chosen analytical framework, Life Psychology framework, and contribute to develop its 
theoretical accuracy. 
 
Objective and Research Questions 
The objective of the study is to increase understanding for what makes returning FTFs 
commit to a sustained reintegration process. Specifically, the study seeks to examine why 
returnees commit to reintegration, what challenges are experienced in sustaining commitment 
and how challenges experienced are addressed by returning FTFs. For the purpose of the 
objective, Kwale is used as a case study in order to answer the following research questions:  
• Why are returnees in Kwale committed to the reintegration process? 
• What are the challenges in the reintegration process in Kwale, and how are these 
addressed by returnees? 
 
Literature Review 
The 9/11 attacks fueled the global war on terrorism; the security oriented, hard 
approach to counter violent extremism and terrorism activity (Miall et al., 2016), but has 
brought the international community no closer to reaching a common definition of terrorism, 
let alone how to combat it (IEP, 2017; 2019). Within this discourse, uncompromising and 
punitive measures are advocated for and realism-oriented critics reject “talking to terrorists” 
as legitimizing violence (Miall et al., 2016, p. 333) and undermining “democracy and state 
legitimacy” (Clubb, 2016, p. 844). However, the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism 
notes that the preceding security-oriented strategy has “not been sufficient to prevent the 
spread of violent extremism” (UNGA, 2015, p. 2) and instead proved likely to provoke 
retaliatory violence (Miall et al., 2016). How programmes targeting FTFs should be carried 
out remains part of the highly politicized debate. 
Parallel to calls for strict incarceration and institutional rehabilitation of returnees, 
counterarguments refer to how criminalization and stigmatization undermine disengagement 
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(Marsden, 2017) and how prison environments often serve to proliferate radicalization 
(Gunaratna, 2011; Kruglanski et al., 2019) while emphasizing that if all currently engaged 
FTFs were to return to their countries of origin, state capacity would be severely challenged in 
performing judicial procedures (RAN, 2016; 2017). Furthermore, not all terror affiliates can 
be proved to, nor have, engaged in violence (Holmer and Shtuni, 2017; Kruglanski et al., 
2019). The definition of an FTF includes all guilty of “perpetration, planning, or preparation 
of, or participation in, terrorist acts” (UNSC, 2014, p. 2), and does not differentiate between 
individuals who are radicalized and those who are not, who have or have not directly 
participated in combat, nor voluntary recruits or trafficked persons. While the UNSC 
Resolution 2178 (2014) recognized a need for a multi-stakeholder approach for developing 
rehabilitation and reintegration strategies, it fails to take into consideration the heterogeneity 
of the group this is urged for. 
Researchers, scholars and institutions alike recognize that incentives for an FTF to 
disengage vary as much as the motives stimulating initial radicalization (Altier et al., 2014; 
Holmer and Shtuni, 2017; Khalil et al., 2019; Koehler, 2016; Kruglanski et al., 2019; RAN, 
2016; 2017). As Horgan (see: 2008; 2009; 2011; 2012; 2016) predicted an increase in 
attention to deradicalization, he stressed the necessity to distinguish between concepts by 
illustrating that disengagement not automatically entails deradicalization (Horgan, 2009). The 
latter has further been argued to internalize the issue to regard solely the individual who has 
been radicalized, while overlooking structural causes and various combinations of factors 
inciting radicalization as well as the potential of externalities to reduce sympathy for, and 
involvement in, violence (Khalil et al., 2019; Marsden, 2017). Whether or not disengagement 
precedes deradicalization, the inconsistency in use of the terms (Altier et al., 2014) is rejected 
with reference to parallel cognitive and behavioral processes, and hence conceptual 
decoupling of attitude and behavior is necessary (Khalil et al., 2019). Further, Marsden (2017) 
emphasizes the difference between deradicalization and reintegration, stressing that the later 
can in fact occur in the absence of the former. 
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Koehler (2016) noted the deficit in deradicalization theories despite the prevalence in 
implementation of programmes for rehabilitation and reintegration of extremists in over 40 
countries in previous decades. While scholars (Gunaratna, 2011; Holmer and Shtuni, 2017; 
Jawaid, 2017; Koehler, 2016; Kruglanski et al., 2019) have assessed programmes 
predominantly developed for a post-incarceration phase, it has been concluded that the 
assessed initiatives portrayed an incoherent range of similarities and differences arguably due 
to the lack of generalizable theories or strategies for reintegration (Koehler, 2016). Welcomed 
theory suggestions, including the Pro-integration Model (Barrelle, 2015), depluralization 
(Koehler, 2016) and Rusbult’s investment model (Altier et al., 2014), highlight engagement 
with receiving societies as determinant for disengagement (Altier et al., 2014; Barrelle, 2015; 
Khalil et al, 2019; Koehler, 2016). Notably, it has been argued that a common reason for 
staying with an extremist group is the absence of something to return to (Altier et al., 2014; 
Noricks, 2009), which indicates the importance of the receiving society’s willingness to incite 
and facilitate disengagement. Perspective-taking (Noor and Halabi, 2018) is suggested to 
decrease hostility while facilitating favorable consequences within the dynamic relationship 
between returnees and communities, including positive interpersonal attraction (Noor and 
Halabi, 2018) and pro-social bonds (Altier et al., 2014), which in turn encourage forgiveness 
of an out-group member (Noor and Halabi, 2018). However, due to origin, returnees diffuse 
the boundaries of external and internal upon return (Clubb, 2016). 
Nonetheless, assessing the reintegration imperative, Holmer and Shtuni (2017) 
recognized that those who approach reintegration programmes “have already progressed a 
certain cognitive distance toward disengagement from the group and are actively seeking 
assistance” (Holmer and Shtuni, 2017, p. 7) which demonstrates the necessity of developing 
informed programmes to attract those who have not disengaged nor deradicalized. However, 
Marsden (2017) notes that the differing dynamics driving people in and out of extremism 
cannot be generalized and calls for more research regarding why returnees remain committed 
to reintegration in a continuously changing process, in a context where the returnee can be 
socially stigmatized, experiences limited opportunities, is socially excluded and, as in the case 
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of Kwale, have their lives restricted by insecurity and sense of surveillance by returnees with 
retaliatory intentions (RoK, 2017). While recognized as a valuable resource in CVE (Clubb, 
2016; Noor and Halabi, 2018; Tapley and Clubb, 2019), beyond providing intelligence and 
understanding for radicalization (Clubb, 2016; Tapley and Clubb, 2019), returnees are 
increasingly engaged in de-glamorizing rather than morally de-legitimizing violence (Clubb, 
2016). The credibility of the individual is contextual in relation to target audience (Clubb, 
2016) and relies on the returnee’s current ties with the former network, which can 
compromise a victim-centered approach in favor of vicarious forgiveness (Tapley and Clubb, 
2019). While reintegration objectives suggest preventing recidivism and countering sympathy 
to violence (Khalil et al., 2019), the importance of individual resilience in remaining 
disengaged, despite challenges faced in practice, contributes to societal collective resilience to 
violent extremism and cannot be underemphasized (Marsden, 2017). 
Indications of promising outcomes of family involvement in the rehabilitation and 
reintegration of returnees are detectable (Koehler, 2016; Marsden, 2017; RAN, 2017). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that family relations and roles are viewed and 
experienced differently in individualistic and collectivist societies. In the latter, one might 
assume that close community extending beyond the immediate family plays an equivalently 
important part in reintegrating returnees as the immediate family in the former. Mirahmadi’s 
recognition of communities being an “underutilized resource” (Mirahmadi, 2016, p. 130) in 
building resilience against extremism is hence relevant. It is highlighted that programmes 
demonstrate higher success levels when they constitute a bottom-up approach; community-led 
and developed while legitimacy is facilitated by the top-down support from local and national 
government and judiciary (Mirahmadi, 2016). 
Reports on CVE in Kwale elaborate on the implementation and development of 
programmes for rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees, while monitoring and process 
evaluation remain to be published. It is noted that the evaluative literature on reintegration 
processes is insufficient much due to security precautions, lack of transparency, the 
continuous nature of the process and that many programmes remain in relatively infant stages 
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(Koehler, 2016; Kruglanski et al., 2019). Qualitative field research predominantly engages 
practitioners and mentors of previously incarcerated radicalized individuals and more research 
in which beneficiaries of interventions inform research is encouraged. It is argued that while 
comprehensive evaluation is inhibited, monitoring of the implementation of strategies is 
essential and can only be informed by those in the process of reintegrating (Marsden, 2017). 
Subsequent to the plethora of practices in conduct of disengagement, deradicalization and 
reintegration programmes targeting FTFs, the conceptual understanding is no longer as 
“undertheorized” (Noricks, 2009, p. 299) as claimed a decade ago, but remains speculative 
and theoretical (Gill et al., 2015). 
 
Life Psychology – Analytical Framework 
 
The theoretical rationale of the Life Psychology framework relies on the assumption that all 
humans seek to attain a good life (Bertelsen, 2015). A good life is obtained when an 
individual is capable of managing challenges and tasks, which is possible if the level of 
challenges align with an individuals developed set of abilities and skills (Bertelsen, 2015). 
When level of skills and tasks are aligned in a state of flow, it creates a sense of internal 
satisfaction, security and harmony (Csíkszentmihályi, 1990, ed. 2008). This satisfaction is 
described as life embeddedness (Bertelsen, 2015). 
 
Life Embeddedness 
Life embeddedness forms resilience against risks, threats and challenges (Bertelsen, 
2015, 2016). The definition of life embeddedness draws on a multitude of scholars’ 
interdisciplinary ontological concepts regarding notions of trust, coherence, belonging, 
existentialism and security (see Bowlby, 1988; Erikson, 1995; Kruglanski, 2012; Laing, 1969; 
Polanyi, 1957, and others). The active aspiration for life embeddedness is enabled through 
abilities, i.e. the use of skills, which are developed in order to approach the range of 
opportunities for self-fulfillment and development as well as challenges and threats, i.e. tasks, 
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life presents (Bertelsen, 2015, 2016). The tasks and skills are argued to be fundamental and 
universal, irrespective of culture, gender, origin etcetera, as the aim for all human beings is to 
maintain life embeddedness (Bertelsen, 2015). 
Life Psychology categorizes life embeddedness into three main groups: 1) 
participation, 2) attunement, and 3) perspective taking; containing the aligned skills and tasks 
which create the state of flow. However, external events such as exclusion, stigmatization or 
marginalization can challenge these categories, creating a state of non-flow. If tasks are not 
challenging enough in relation to skills developed, an individual will experience a “frustrated 
surplus” (Bertelsen, 2016, p. 5), i.e. frustrating non-flow, where tasks presented do not require 
meaningful use of skills. Similarly, if tasks are too challenging an individual experiences 
“overwhelming deficit”, i.e. overwhelming non-flow, as one’s skills are not sufficient to 
handle tasks (Bertelsen, 2016, p. 5). 
 
Figure 1. Source: Bertelsen, 2015, p. 249 
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Participation 
To obtain a satisfactory level of participation, an individual uses skills to actively 
participate in the construct of life. This entails being part of a community while: developing 
social relationships; shaping framework for preferences and interests; enrolling in meaningful 
activities, e.g. interest groups or recreational activities; and, being able to influence the social 
environment (Bertelsen, 2016). Frustrating non-flow can occur if participation is disabled by 
deficit in support or not acknowledged by the surroundings (Bertelsen, 2016). Overwhelming 
non-flow can occur when possibilities for participation are too complex for developed skillset 
(Bertelsen, 2016). 
 
 
Attunement 
Life embeddedness entails the aligning of morals, beliefs and way of living with the 
surrounding reality. This is enabled when an individual is realistic, pragmatically sets goals 
and makes plans for how to use skills to successfully and efficiently arrive at objectives 
(Bertelsen, 2016). Frustrating non-flow can occur if the surrounding environment is insecure 
or chaotic, which makes aligning impossible. Overwhelming non-flow can occur if future 
planning is unpragmatic due to lack of clear agenda, or when expectations are confusing or 
not clearly perceived by the individual (Bertelsen, 2016). 
 
Perspective Taking 
Perspective taking entails the ability to understand own and others’ perspectives, 
wants and needs, and structural regulations, systems and rules (Bertelsen, 2016), which 
includes ability to develop empathy and to be able to sense and correspond to not verbally 
expressed signals from others. Frustrating non-flow can occur when not exposed to other 
perspectives, i.e. when the ability to understand others is neither challenged nor developed. 
Overwhelming non-flow can occur when understanding and perspective taking is impossible 
due to unclear or insufficient information available (Bertelsen, 2016). 
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Threatened Life Embeddedness 
When life embeddedness is threatened, the individual will resort to activities aimed at 
restoring the state of flow (2015). The reaction is argued to be natural and universal, 
undertaken through efforts to either change the own life or the external surroundings through 
the use of skills (Bertelsen, 2015). A set of moderating factors are argued to determine how an 
individual will use skills to restore life embeddedness: if factors are in a low-state mode, skills 
will be expressed through legal activity; and, if in a high-state mode, one will turn to illegal 
activism or violent extremism (Bertelsen, 2015; 2016). The factors are want, ability, doing, 
possibilities and being met. Bertelsen (2016) describes want as the expression of motivation 
and level of energy to use a skill; ability as the internal, cognitive and practical capacity to use 
a skill; doing as the actualizing or realizing action in using a skill; possibilities as the external 
and structural factors such as norms and laws which guides ways to develop skills; and, being 
met as having support or being acknowledged by society (Bertelsen, 2015; 2016). Figure 1 
portrays how these factors, in a high-state mode, can lead to radicalized activism. 
 
Illegal Radicalized Activism 
The Life Psychology framework recognizes different types of extremism, and 
Bertelsen (2016) highlights how important it is to distinguish between non-violent and violent 
extremism. Above elaborated factors will determine which path the individual seeking to 
reconstruct life embeddedness will embark on: resorting to legal political or religious activity 
or illegal activities which can escalate to illegal radicalized activism (Bertelsen, 2015; 2016). 
 
Reintegrating by Restoring Life Embeddedness 
The fundamental aspiration to actively direct competencies towards establishing life 
embeddedness is undertaken in non-radical and extremist environments alike when life 
embeddedness is perceived as threatened (Bertelsen, 2015; 2016), and hence the Life 
Psychology framework can be argued to work in reverse; according to which disengaging 
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individuals are to be empowered with opportunities to develop skills to handle challenges 
faced in reintegration. 
Needless to say, individuals who have committed atrocities and violations of human 
rights should undergo applicable judicial procedures. However, in the events that evidence are 
insufficient for a conviction or FTFs have been pardoned with amnesty, it is essential that the 
individual is enabled to align skills and tasks to restore and reconstruct life embeddedness 
(Bertelsen, 2015). Bertelsen (2015) argues that building resilience through dialogue, 
education, counselling and other efforts will assist in transforming the moderating factors; 
initially in a high-state mode triggering the individual to resort to radical illegal extremism, 
amended to low-risk mode to enable the individual to develop participation, attunement and 
perspective taking. Bertelsen argues that the Life Psychology framework demonstrates that 
this is possible and necessary (2015). 
 
Use and Choice of Framework 
The study adopts the main assumption of the Life Psychology framework; the human 
aspiration to restore or construct life embeddedness. Hence, the analytical framework is 
allowed to partially guide identifying factors of relevance for the analysis of the reintegration 
process experienced by returning FTFs in Kwale, in order to assess if moderation of factors 
enable restoring life embeddedness. Since the skills used to reconstruct life embeddedness are 
determined in relation to external structures and conditions (Bertelsen, 2016), views of 
stakeholders and actors in CVE initiatives and reintegration programmes complement the 
experiences accounted by returnees. 
The framework distinguishes itself as one of few existing disciplines addressing both 
the motivating factors for radicalization as well as components inducive of reintegration 
(Bertelsen, 2015; Ozer and Bertelsen, 2019); as push- and pull factors for radicalization do 
not directly reflect those of deradicalization, yet are assessed to be connected (Bertelsen, 
2015; Koehler, 2016; Kruglanski et al., 2019). The framework currently offers the theoretical 
foundation for the Aarhus Model; an anti- and deradicalization initiative piloted in the 
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individualistic context of Aarhus, Denmark, in 2014 (RAN, 2016; 2017). Due to security 
concerns regarding the reintegration of returning FTFs, the model has not been implemented 
without critique, as the approach has attracted attention as a “hug a terrorist”-model (SBS, 
2017). Nevertheless, the theoretical foundation of the Aarhus Model presents a relevant 
framework for analysis of how reintegration is experienced by FTFs returning to origins 
elsewhere, due to it being presented as a generalizable theory (Bertelsen, 2015; 2016; Ozer 
and Bertelsen, 2019). 
 
Methodological Framework 
 
The methodological approach for the conduct of the study is a qualitative case study of 
Kwale, in order to enhance understanding for the reintegration process (Bryman, 2016; 
Creswell, 2013; Thomas and Mohan, 2015). The study adopts an interpretivist 
epistemological position, as it seeks to understand the phenomena of reintegration by bringing 
forth the participants’ perceptions, without attributing Kwale characteristics of generalized 
reintegration derived from a global imperative or discourse (Bryman, 2016). It takes on a 
constructionist ontological position as the characteristics of reintegration are assumed to be a 
result of human interaction. The chosen logic of abduction allows for the analytical 
framework to guide, yet not lead, the study while illuminating challenges experienced which 
will further be allowed to improve the theoretical framework (Bryman, 2016; Danermark et 
al., 2002). 
 
Sampling and Primary Data Collection 
Method for data collection include snowball sampling of interviewees, with which 24 
semi-structured interviews were conducted: 10 with key informants, i.e. FTFs labelled as 
returnees (R), including 6 male and 4 female respondents in age range from 24 to 50 years. 
All interviewed returnees identify as Muslim and all but 2 belong to the Digo ethnic group. 9 
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are part of the amnesty programme announced by the GoK in 2015 (Kenya Gazette, 2017) 
and 1 (R10) is an unregistered beneficiary of other implemented initiative. 
Key respondents’ accounts are complemented and validated by 14 key stakeholders 
and actors prominent in reintegration initiatives, consisting of: 2 professors (P) with 
significant experience in research on CVE and reintegration in Kenya; 6 civil society actors 
(CSAs), ranging from volunteers in community based organizations (CBOs) to coordinators 
and executive directors of non-governmental organizations (NGOs); 1 distinguished religious 
leader (RL); 2 official actors (OAs), of which 1 on county level and 1 on national level; and 3 
international actors (IAs). 
Further, the study adopts data triangulation, i.e. review and analysis of primary and 
secondary data, including official documents and academic literature, not only to validate 
gathered data but to increase understanding for the phenomena of reintegration in Kwale 
(Yeasmin and Rahman, 2012). 
 
Limitations and Delimitations 
The sampling was limited to include, with 2 exceptions, individuals identifying with 
being Muslim and Digo, which is not to ignore that individuals identifying with other or no 
religion, and from different socioeconomic backgrounds and ethnic communities, engage in 
violent extremism. Nevertheless, triangulating this occurrence notes marginalization of the 
Digo community in Kwale, while representative of ethnic majority of individuals from the 
area radicalized or recruited to Al Shabaab (CSA1; CSA4; IA3; OA1; OA2). 
Delimited to the reintegration process facilitated locally in Kwale County while 
exclusively focusing on strategies developed for returning FTFs pardoned with amnesty, i.e. 
returnees not prosecuted or incarcerated following conviction of terrorism offence according 
to Kenyan Law (Kenya Law, 2015), the study excludes accounts of radicalized individuals 
who have joined the domestic secessionist group Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) or 
other local, regional or transnational extremist movements. 
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Ethical Considerations 
 Due to the sensitive nature of the study, conducted in a fragile and violent 
environment, ethical issues demand detailed consideration. Snowball sampling stresses close 
attention to integrity and contextual power relations in order for all respondents to participate 
voluntarily (Cronin-Fruman and Lake, 2018), fully aware of the objectives of the study 
(Bryman, 2016, referencing Diener and Crandall, 1978), and from whom informed consent is 
obtained. The interviewed returnees were sampled on premises of being able to assess their 
reintegration process, i.e. interviews were not conducted with vulnerable individuals who had 
recently returned or were in earlier stages of reintegration. 
Objective, and throughout research continuous, risk assessments were carried out to 
ensure interviews would not pose security threats to respondents, researcher or surroundings, 
while ensuring cooperative organizations at no point compromised their ethics of conduct 
(Cronin-Fruman and Lake, 2018). The objective of learning from CVE practices in Kwale to 
inform strategy development elsewhere was disclosed while exercised with caution, so as to 
not violate sentiments, culture or values of participants (Bryman, 2016). 
 
Contextualization 
 
The coastal county of Kwale spearheaded the development of CVE strategies in Kenya (RoK, 
2017); divided into preventive and curative efforts aimed to guide the multi-stakeholder 
approach. The reintegration component of the strategy addresses associated challenges and 
assigns responsibility to county and government officials, but avails room for cooperation 
with “strategic partners” (RoK, 2017, p. 53). The latter is not in law amendable, as association 
with FTFs is illegal unless the returning FTFs obtains amnesty. However, the amnesty, 
declared by the President in 2014, is not Gazetted and has hence not been formally adopted as 
a law-abiding policy. 
Subsequent to the announced amnesty, an international organization (IO), together 
with government officials and civil society actors, introduced a livelihood program targeting 
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returnees. 48 identified beneficiaries received counselling and livelihood alternatives such as 
boda-bodas [motorcycles] or tuk-tuks [auto rickshaws] for operating transport businesses, and 
refrigerators and freezers for fish vending (CSA1; CSA5; CSA6; IA1; P2). The effort is 
described as a “disaster” (P1; P2) due to the identities of, with amnesty pardoned, returnees 
made public; provoking retaliatory attacks by returnees who were not availed the same 
opportunities, or whom perceived returning FTFs as traitors (BRICS, 2016; P1; P2). Actors 
explain that this triggered a wave of killings of returnees (Capital News, 2017; Guardian, 
2017; Mwabege, 2016; CSA1; P1; P2), sporadic yet persistent during the time of research. 
The deteriorating security situation has been countered with firm measures by government 
officials and security forces, culminating in extrajudicial violence, killings and 
disappearances.  
Parallel to ongoing recruitment (BRICS, 2016; CSAs; OAs; Rs), FTFs disengage from 
Al Shabaab: some due to experienced discrimination in the ranks or disillusionment due to 
inconsistency between held beliefs and reality, others for retaliatory reasons. Interviewed 
returnees account for intentions to reintegrate; some indicating missing family while all imply 
longing for security and acceptance (CSA2; CSA4; CSA5; OA1; P2; R1; R2; R7; S1). 
Regardless of reasons and ways to disengage, whether dynamic changes in attitude or 
behavior (Altier et al., 2014; Khalil et al., 2019), many of the responding returning FTFs 
express a strong fear for Al Shabaab left behind as well as a fear of what they face in their 
respective communities in Kwale.   
 
Findings – Returning Home 
 
Returning FTFs face multiple challenges upon return, including difficulties in rejoining 
community as well as possible acts of retaliation from radicals who return not intending to 
reintegrate. For many, returning to communities becomes a gradual process during which 
majority of respondents initially lived in hiding. While none of the respondents publicly 
disclosed their affiliation with Al Shabaab, most respondents recount being met with 
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suspicion and resentment due to circulating rumors (R1; R6; R7). R2 and R8 were welcomed 
back by family, yet experienced being avoided by community members. In contrast, when 
R10 returned home in 2015, her family rejected her. She retells staying indoors, afraid of 
being killed due to community speculation regarding her association with Al Shabaab, and 
was hence forced to relocate to a new area where her background remained unknown. 
Respondents R3, R4 and R5 were able to join their communities directly upon return, as their 
affiliation with Al Shabaab remained unknown. 
Actors describe returning FTFs as rightfully “suspicious” (CSA3; OA1); perceived as 
security threats which community members are not hesitant to expose to security agents 
(CSA1; CSA3; CSA4; CSA5; CSA6; OA1; OA2). Societal resentment is acknowledged as a 
factor rendering returnees unsure of who they can turn to (CSA1), and it is known that many 
returnees first turn to families and their immediate social network, including religious 
communities (CSA5); CSA3 concurring “[t]hose are the houses that they run to first”. CSA5, 
a local peace committee member, explains that civil society actors convene around this initial 
network to engage in dialogue, in order to support family members as they convince returnees 
to “embrace amnesty” (CSA5). A religious leader discloses that many returnees frequently 
visit mosques upon return to communities (RL1). However, an actor states that “community 
preparedness for reintegration of these people is still very low” (CSA4) and others note that 
communities often stigmatize those associated with recruits and returnees (OA2; P1). 
Families are stigmatized and accused of e.g. “eating from the profits” of terrorism (P2), hiding 
returnees (CSA3) and perceiving returnees as heroes (OA1). This is argued to compromise 
deradicalization and reintegration programmes, as it is important for security and community 
to know who enrolls in the reintegration process and with what motives (IA1; OA1; OA2). 
 
The Amnesty  
All interviewed returnees, with one exception (R10), have obtained amnesty. The 
conduct of practices under the amnesty and related programmes have presented opportunities 
and severe challenges to beneficiaries. 
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Returnees have been enabled to engage with the GoK in ways not possible in absence 
of an amnesty (CSA3; OA1; R1). Prior to the announcement of the amnesty programme 
(Kenya Gazette, 2017), a limited number of returnees were approached and encouraged to 
partake in dialogue with government officials and civil society actors to inform practice (R1, 
R6). Actors confirm having engaged in identifying and profiling returnees on behalf of the 
government (CSA1; CSA4; CSA6) and CSA6, engaged with returnees whom on return to 
Kenya were hiding prior to surrendering, accounts “[i]t’s very risky to meet someone with an 
AK47 in a forest” (CSA6). 
One of the respondents confirms receiving a motorcycle through the programme (R2), 
others assess it has opened a platform for counselling and support (R9; R10) while some refer 
to a land cultivation project enabling a collective of returnees to engage in farming (R4; 
CSA1; CSA6). However, all respondents are critical to how the practice has been carried out 
and stress the severe limitations regarding the missing legal framework for amnesty. R7 
explains; “Since 2015, we have that concept [of amnesty], but [it] is not a policy”. The 
missing policies are stated as reason to why many returning FTFs disregard obtaining 
amnesty, which in turn has caused cleavages among returnees. Fear as well as envy related to 
livelihood alternatives provided to returnees enrolled in amnesty programmes, whose 
identities have not been anonymized in communities, induce retaliation by other returnees 
(CSA1; CSA2; R4). The latter group can be categorized in returnees who are either afraid to 
enroll, those awaiting appropriate time to enroll meanwhile fearing being identified by 
amnesty-protected returnees, and those who are simply unwilling to reintegrate and accuse 
others of betrayal (CSA3; CSA6; OA1; OA3). 
All respondents accuse security agents for the use of excessive force and extrajudicial 
killings targeting returnees. The representative for the County Commission, under which the 
mandate of security officials is established, states that the County Commission “does not give 
[security officials] instructions on what to do in their day to day activities” and “only gives 
them instructions on policy” (OA1). The representative states that arrests of returning FTFs 
engaged in criminal activities or those not enrolled in amnesty might lead some to incorrectly 
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believe returnees explicitly are harassed (OA1). Furthermore, local elders [respected informal 
community leaders] and peace committee members, with relations to security officials, have 
been killed by, allegedly, returnees (CSA1; CSA2; Mwabege, 2016). 
All actors and stakeholders express concerns for how spoilers approach programmes, 
but rely on identification conducted by the government and civil society, and the County 
Commission representative states; “We have a way of finding out whether he is a genuine one 
or not” (OA1). A professor states the amnesty strategy “wasn’t effective because the 
government was not prepared to have a long-term view of the amnesty” (P1). Several actors 
engaging in reintegration initiatives believe that returnees accept amnesty only in the absence 
of other alternatives (CSA2; CSA4; CSA5; OA2), CSA4 stating; “They know they will be 
killed if they don’t [enroll]”. The county official confirms that returnees who do not obtain 
amnesty are arrested and prosecuted (OA1). 
 
Engaging with Communities 
Many respondents participate as active community members, engaged in CVE 
initiatives to prevent radicalization. R1 describes himself as an activist who participated in 
forming a local organization for returnees. The organization is registered and supported by an 
established CSO in the area, and committed returnees are described as “change agents” 
(CSA6). Furthermore, returnees partake in integration programmes such as football 
tournaments enabling returnees and law enforcement officers to interact in order to mitigate 
cleavages, while others actively participate in preventive initiatives targeting youth vulnerable 
to recruitment (R1; R6; R7). R7 participates as an active community member by “going to 
peace forums, chief barazas [public meetings], weddings, burials, to sit in mosque and advice 
young brothers” (R7), and R9 and R10 have received support and counselling through 
targeted programmes. Some of the returnees interviewed participate in their communities in 
the roles of parents; R2 and R7 have since their return gotten married and had children, which 
has enhanced their community participation. 
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Actors interviewed express certain expectations regarding how returning FTFs should 
act when returning to communities. Many note how returnees “isolate” themselves from 
social settings (CSA1; CSA2; CSA4; CSA5). Hence, initiatives are designed with youth and 
madrasa leaders perceived as mentors and “the confidants of the people who return” (CSA3). 
Furthermore, returnees are assisted in obtaining “government services so that they can […] 
apply for grants to start income generating activities” (CSA3). While many returnees have not 
obtained or concluded secondary education (CSA1; CSA5; OA1), it is noted socioeconomic 
or sociopolitical status is not a determinant for recruitment or radicalization (Marsden, 2016; 
RAN, 2016). Nevertheless, a county official argues that returnees lack capacity, knowledge, 
education and tools to “restart their lives” and asserts that the government takes responsibility 
in capacity building and availing tools for development (OA1). In return, it is emphasized that 
it is fair to “expect [returnees] to take advantage of the skills to better their lives” (OA1). A 
religious leader emphasizes that some returnees are educated carpenters, masonries and 
electricians, while some holders of driver’s licenses, arguing “it’s a part of the puzzle for us to 
find ways in which we can help” (RL1) in encouraging developing and actualizing skills in 
practice. RL1 believes that if returnees are given financial incentives, they are more 
encouraged to commit to reintegration and not turn to criminal activities (RL1). A professor 
confirms that livelihood alternatives provided incite reintegration (P1). 
Some actors have noted that CVE and reintegration initiatives are by many only seen 
as a sector for employment, resulting in “a lot of competition, a lot of duplication” (CSA6) 
among stakeholders. It is urged that the work “should be genuine” (CSA6) and “[w]hen you 
do something, you need to do it from your heart” (CSA1). Returnees are encouraged to work 
with CVE initiatives, as they are key actors in informing the design of programmes (OA2) 
and possess “battlefield intelligence […] that would never be shared with law enforcement 
and security” (IA1). 
However, P1 discusses a notion of polarization between the “different segmentations 
of society”; i.e. beneficiaries and practitioners, retelling how national figures engaged in 
reintegration initiatives display prejudice using “a lot of stereotypes in defining the people 
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that they [are] supposed to have interventions with” (P1), which discourages cooperation. 
Furthermore, some actors acknowledge societal failure “to offer [returnees] a sense of 
belonging” (CSA1; CSA2; CSA3) and “[f]eeling loved” (CSA3). 
 
Conforming to Reintegration 
 Some of the respondents describe experiencing rehabilitation, cognitive and 
behavioral, through counselling or participation in various activities, which has enabled them 
to readjust morals, beliefs or values to align those of their respective communities. R9 states; 
“I didn’t feel like talking, I didn’t feel like telling anyone anything”, until she was encouraged 
to participate in a forum for victims of violent extremism, where she received counselling. 
R10 retells how she used to “have so many nightmares, the flashbacks of what happened” and 
is grateful for the counselling and support from the women’s network. R3 explains that 
despite difficulties faced since returning from Somalia, she would never return. She finds that 
it is better to “die at home rather than to die outside”, referring to encountered challenges in 
Kenya in comparison with those in Somalia (R3).  
Others express discontent or similar sentiments and perceptions of grievances as prior 
to joining Al Shabaab. Despite his activism in the community, R1 still indicates a strong sense 
of obedience to leader figures. He explains he would not hesitate to rejoin Al Shabaab if a 
prominent leader in his religious community was to encourage the engagement. R4 refers to 
the contingent nature of humans, and since “a human can change at any time” he cannot 
assure he would not opt out of the reintegration process. He struggles with what he describes 
as “wrong” ways of living among his country men, who do not “follow the rules of Allah” 
(R4). He also states that if extrajudicial killings continue and more individuals enrolled in, or 
affiliated with, amnesty are killed “by the Government”, he will see no other option than to 
leave Kenya. R7 says that he has considered going back to Somalia, but refrains from 
rejoining as he is reluctant “to see fighting [and] to shed a lot of blood”. 
An INGO representative believes commitment to reintegrate can be categorized as 
“egocentric security reasons” by individuals who do not give up ideological believes, or as a 
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“change of mind” subsequent to not ideologically motivated recruitment (IA1). Some civil 
society actors believe returnees commit to reintegration due to them being “young when 
recruited” (CSA1) and as they have grown, they “welcome new things in life, like family” 
(CSA3). According to actors, they engage returnees in actively deciding and planning their 
own futures; CSA6 explains that “[b]ecause they were in another world and now they came 
back” it is important to ask “[w]hat do they want to do for a living?”. 
Former ideologically motivated recruits imply they could, in certain circumstances, 
rejoin Al Shabaab. This implies importance in working with ideological sentiments, which is 
often carried out through counter-narratives. Actors express differing opinions regarding the 
approach, stating that “their entry point is actually to challenge the jihad” in religious spaces, 
which is argued to hold potential to do more harm than good among those ideologically 
radicalized (P1). P1 confirms having “never met a returnee who says that if a jihad is called 
by the competent Muslim leader, they would not participate in it because fighting is wrong”, 
and assures; “if they find another place that interprets jihad properly, they will be prepared to 
participate in it again” (P1). In addition; CSA3 expresses fear that when recruited, returnees 
felt “they are loved, they are liked, they are listened to” which might motivate rejoining 
(CSA3). 
 
Developing Understanding for Community Perception 
 Some interviewees portray understanding for how communities and officials perceive 
them (R1; R9), whereas others have not reflected on community-held perceptions (R3; R5; 
R8). While some think they should be met differently, i.e. receive more understanding and 
support (R3; R4), others contemplate how communities’ perceptions affect reintegration 
efforts (R1; R6; R7; R9). In addition, some returnees express thoughts on their role and 
responsibility in reintegration (R1; R2; R6; R9). 
R4 says he has not undergone a change following his return; “I left the fight, but I 
didn’t change. I am a Muslim and I will remain so until my death” and elaborates on his held 
belief that “[a]ll non-Muslims are thinking that Muslims are terrorists”. R1 acknowledges the 
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fear of returnees among communities and the government, but encourages mutual trust by 
lowering levels of fear; “It’s not good for a man or a woman to live in fear all the time. Or to 
live in the bush all the time, like an animal.” He encourages unconditional support of 
returnees, even in the event of setbacks; “[e]ither they [the efforts] work or they don’t work, 
but [the community] should embrace them [returnees]”. He continues; “Even a mad person, if 
you embraced him, he will see you’re a good person. So you can shave him, you can take of 
his clothes and be washed, and he can embrace you. But if you see a mad person and always 
you are chasing him away, when he sees you, he will run” (R1). R9 further addresses 
practitioners in CVE initiatives, urging; “[t]hey don’t have to give up on us, even if we are too 
hard to understand. But they have to give us their benefit of that doubt, to listen to us, to hear 
us, even if we make trouble, they have to bear with us.” She portrays a strong commitment to 
helping others who have been in her situation and stresses the need to assure returning FTFs 
and victims of terror they are not alone in their “suffering”, which gives her a sense of 
fulfillment (R9). 
R8 explains how he, despite difficulties, feels loved by his family. In return, his 
commitment to his family, including parents, 2 wives and 11 children, makes him commit to 
reintegration. R2 indicates feelings of owing community and family his contribution, social 
and financial, in order to be accepted back into the community. He explains it has been 
difficult to connect with community again, and that the resentment he perceives from the 
community members was not what he expected. He elaborates on his sense of exclusion; 
“When I go to the football like here, I can sit alone” and expresses a wish for the community 
to know he is a good person and that he regrets he joined Al Shabaab.  
R7 says he received help from a local human rights organization to understand his 
rights, which equipped him with knowledge useful when confronted by law enforcement. 
CSA1, CSA4 and CSA6 confirm how volunteers and organizations have worked to raise 
returnees’ knowledge of human rights. In the meantime, county officials acknowledge that 
stigmatization is an issue (OA1) and hence actors emphasize how reintegration “has to be 
done in two ways” (CSA4); by “preparing the community to understand that these people […] 
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need our support” and “the foreign fighters, returnees, defectors, to know that the community 
that they want to […] reintegrate with, would not view them as they did before” (CSA4). 
Managing expectations of returnees and communities alike is seen as essential (CSA1; CSA2; 
CSA4; CSA6). 
Some actors advocate for compassion and understanding (CSA1) and highlight how 
returnees willing to reintegrate despite fear, as they “want to be safe” (CSA2), indicates 
commitment (CSA3). Some actors describe a sense of responsibility; “they are our youth” 
(CSA6), and a will to help the ones who are “a part of our communities, our families” (RL1). 
Others emphasize a “human rights perspective” per which a victim-centered focus and 
reconciliation need to be prioritized prior to offering returning FTFs “blanket amnesties” 
(CSA4). A representative for an international security think tank further stresses that amnesty 
should not be availed to criminals: returnees who either committed criminal acts prior to their 
affiliation with Al Shabaab, or those who resorted to criminal activity once back in Kenya. An 
INGO representative emphasizes the “fine line” between what is or is not appropriate in 
conduct of reintegration programmes and stresses the need to ask; “What is the bigger 
objective for security?” (IA1). 
 
Trust 
Trust between returning FTFs and community members as well as trust between 
different groups of returnees is fragile. The absence of legal structures for the reintegration 
process is highlighted to undermine the practice, which arguably amplifies the sense of 
lacking trust between all actors, practitioners and beneficiaries. 
The level of trust indicated by returning FTFs varies from non-existent to high towards 
different actors and community members but, overall, returnees trust only a few close 
individuals such as sheikhs and religious leaders (R1), family (R1; R2; R3; R4) or close 
community members (R5; R9; R10). R7 says he does not trust anyone. R9 stresses the 
importance of a returnee to trust in order to heal; “When you remove what you have inside, 
the torture inside you […] [y]ou feel good, you can feel free” (R9). 
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 Stakeholders and actors recognize that returnees trust “people who they believe can 
help them” (RL1) and the ones who “took time to win their hearts, and win their trust” 
(CSA1). County officials acknowledge that returnees do not trust government agents, i.e. the 
County Commission or security officials, and actors emphasizes how returnees fear judicial 
procedures even when pleading guilty for amnesty. The “biggest challenge for the returnee” 
remains to know “who is genuine or not” (CSA4) and for the actors to know if returnees 
remain a threat (P1) or if they “return for legitimate reasons” (IA1). Notably, some actors 
acknowledge that returnees trust the County Government (CSA4), as it is elected and 
“constituted by locals” (CSA4; P2). The same actors, however, find that the County 
Government of Kwale seems “uninterested politically” (CSA4; CSA5), portraying “no 
commitment” (CSA4; CSA6). It is argued that the County Government refers to the New 
Constitution of 2010 (Kenya Law, 2010) according to which security matters fall under the 
national governments jurisdiction (P1; BRICS, 2016), but actors are critical regarding how 
they “narrow their definition of security to regard solely crime” (P1), interpreting CVE and 
reintegration as outside of their mandate (IA3; P1). 
 
Legal Framework and Structure for Coordination 
 All returnees have elaborated on implications of missing legal frameworks on security, 
trust and, ultimately, ability to reintegrate. Actors and stakeholders concur with insufficient 
frameworks posing the biggest challenge in engaging with returnees, and hence call for 
structure and coordination among actors (CSA1; CSA3; CSA5), will from national officials 
(CSA6; P2) and clear legal guidelines (CSA4; P1; P2; RL1). An actor refers to the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act criminalizing association with terror suspects (Kenya Law, 2015) restricting 
engagement with returnees as it is seen as “facilitating or sympathizing [with terrorists]” 
(CSA4). Yet, civil society actors defyingly conduct grass root initiatives as they await law 
amendments “so that they respond to the real situation on the ground” (CSA4; CSA6). Local 
actors and an international think-tank representative advocate for CVE objectives to be 
incorporated in the Kwale County Integrated Development Plan for it to be prioritized and 
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operationalized (CSA3; CSA4; IA3). CSA3 emphasizes that “[w]e’ll use less time, less 
resources, but achieve more” if a coordinated approach is committed to by all actors and 
stakeholders. NCTC is referred to as “failing the society” (CSA6) in not allocating sufficient 
financial support to initiatives (P1; P2), not carrying out its mandate under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act Article 40B (2) (Kenya Law, 2015) to co-ordinate national counter-terrorism 
efforts, nor developing coordinated strategies (CSA4, CSA6).   
An international actor expresses a willingness to assist the GoK in reintegration 
initiatives, but as a legal framework is yet to be presented for assessment and evaluation, 
“material restrictions” (IA2) legally confine association with reintegration programmes. An 
INGO representative states that international actors can assists states and domestic 
stakeholders upon request, as government commitment is necessary to ensure understanding 
for local dynamics and implementation of process of change (IA1). 
 
Analysis 
 
Adopting the central assumption of the Life Psychology framework; that all individuals 
exercise agency in restoring life embeddedness when experiencing it to be threatened or in a 
state of non-flow (Bertelsen, 2015; 2016), a returning FTF is seen to restore the optimal state 
of flow, through reintegrating in the communities they return to. 
Reintegration will be assumed to entail 1) participation; creating a sense of belonging 
through actively taking part in the community, 2) attunement; adjusting morals and beliefs to 
the community, and 3) perspective taking; developing understanding for others as well as the 
FTFs own part in the community (Bertelsen, 2015; 2016). The moderating factors for the 
outcome, of each category respectively, is demonstrated by the FTF’s want, ability, doing, 
possibility and being met. Want is a sentiment of willingness expressed by the returning FTF, 
and ability is their individual capacity. Doing constitutes the actions undertaken. Possibility 
refers to how the FTF access opportunities offered through external factors such as laws, 
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norms and societal structures and being met is used as a reference to other acknowledging the 
returning FTF. 
 
Commitment to Reintegration 
It is worth noting that the cost-benefit analysis made by an FTF deciding to leave Al 
Shabaab and return to Kwale, despite the life-threatening risks this poses, portrays high levels 
of will to return but says little about actual reasons to reintegrate. All respondents, including 
R10 who is not officially enrolled in the amnesty, have benefitted from amnesty programmes. 
It is the only legitimate way for returning FTFs to reintegrate, acknowledged by the returnees 
and actors alike. Being pardoned with amnesty is hence seen as the first, inevitable step in the 
process of reintegration and will not be analyzed per se, but the associated subsequent 
experiences and challenges will be elaborated on as part of participation, attunement and 
perspective taking as the returning FTF aspire to restore life embeddedness (Bertelsen, 2015; 
2016).  
 
Participation 
Participation entails, according to the Life Psychology, being an active member of a 
community, in which one partakes in meaningful activities, develops skills and relationships 
as well as exercise positive social influence (Bertelsen, 2015; 2016). 
All interviewed FTFs express a want to join their communities again, observable by 
seeing to how all indicate wanting to be accepted. The respondents assert a desire to join their 
families again and to obtain a sense of security. However, the authenticity of expressed desire 
for communal participation is challenged by the lack of other options than obtaining amnesty.  
Interviewed FTFs demonstrate an ability to actively participate by creating a sense of 
belonging in their communities. Returning FTFs engage in CVE initiatives, which enables 
them to socially influence their surrounding environment and therefore enhance their 
participation. It is acknowledged, by returnees and actors alike, that returnees are able to 
contribute to CVE due to their first-hand experience in radicalization and violent extremism. 
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The actual participation, i.e. doing, is portrayed by participation in recreational activities with 
fellow community members. This bridges between different segments of the society but is 
challenged by publicly displayed resentment experienced by some of the returnees, making 
some FTFs withdraw from social settings. 
The possibility to participate is initially offered through the amnesty. It is the primary 
enabler to societal participation, which is secondarily enabled by civil society actors offering 
assistance in gaining access to government services. Government actors are seen to assume 
responsibility in providing possibilities through vocational training, education and 
employment opportunities, but seem to trust that possibilities are already availed. This 
challenges participation, as the returning FTFs are expected to seize opportunities they do not 
perceive available to them, e.g. university enrollment and employment. Furthermore, 
returnees portray an inclination to supporting provision of economic incentives in 
encouraging participation and reintegration, and the sentiment is shared with local actors. 
External actors on the other hand believe this undermines the reintegration process, with 
reference to the implications of providing returnees livelihood alternatives in a society where 
many experience marginalization, discrimination and inequality (RoK, 2017); conditions 
which fuel illegal radicalized activism in the first place. 
Being met entails being acknowledged and supported, which only few of the returning 
FTFs experience via family members or civil society actors who engage FTFs in dialogue 
with the government and stakeholders. However, the majority are met with resentment by 
family, who risk stigmatization if associating publicly with returning FTFs. This is illustrated 
by how e.g. R10 is rejected by family and forced to relocate fearing for her life. 
In conclusion, the studied sample express want and ability to participate, which 
enables them to exercise agency in obtaining societal acceptance and reconciliation with their 
families. Furthermore, some returnees portray a strong inclination to help others who share 
their experiences as well as obtain livelihood alternatives provided. However, possibilities are 
structurally challenged by insecurity, not accessing opportunities, and how returning FTFs are 
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met with a deficit in support and acknowledgement as they attempt to participate. Many are 
rejected or isolated. 
 
Attunement 
Restoring life embeddedness requires the FTF to attune, i.e. pragmatically align 
beliefs, morals and way of living with the surrounding reality as well as plan realistic goals 
along with ways of arriving at those objectives (Bertelsen, 2015; 2016). 
All interviewed FTFs have portrayed a willingness, i.e. want, to attune their behaviors 
to their respective surroundings, by leaving criminal environments or gradually returning to 
their communities. Furthermore, it is suggested that as young recruits grow older, their 
development, maturity and evolved life plans will make them want to attune to a life in their 
communities. However, the FTFs ability to attune beliefs can be questioned. Some make a 
cost-benefit analysis of rejoining Al Shabaab, evidently in the favor of staying in communities 
as costs to enlist are deemed too high. Furthermore, the applicability of the concept of 
attunement, including doing, can be challenged. FTFs who were ideologically motivated to 
join Al Shabaab express inclinations to rejoin the group if jihad is encouraged, which at first 
glance indicates inability to attune morals and beliefs if deradicalization is expected by their 
communities. However, attuning morals and beliefs regarding ideology might not be 
necessary if the community members share radical extremist sentiments. 
The possibility to attune is dependent on external factors, such as counselling and 
support, which is availed to returnees by civil society actors. Receiving psychosocial support 
in reintegration has worked to rehabilitate some interviewees. The possibility is challenged by 
the state of insecurity in Kwale. Recent killings of returnees and civil society actors, 
committed by security officials and returnees with no intention to reintegrate, create an 
insecure environment undermining possibility to attune skills and believes with their 
surroundings.  
Being met and acknowledged while attuning is observed through dedicated civil 
society actors supporting the returning FTFs. Some returnees are approached by fellow 
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returnees sharing the process of attuning, which can be assumed supportive. However, the 
ideologically radicalized individuals are often met by counter narratives. These are described 
to challenge an ideology which a returnee is not yet, and might never be, ready to discharge. 
It can be concluded that the sampled FTFs attune their way of living with the communities 
they return to in order to obtain stability, security or because cost of rejoining Al Shabaab is 
deemed higher relative to staying. Possibilities and support to attune are partially accessed, 
through the support of fellow returnees and dedicated community members, but challenged by 
insecurity. FTFs interviewed seem willing to attune behavior, but unable or not required to 
attune beliefs; either they preserve ideologies in a non-radical setting, or the radical 
sentiments are shared in communities which does not require attuning. None of the 
ideologically motivated FTFs interviewed for this study, nor radicalized individuals whom 
responding actors have engaged with, indicate abandoning their radicalized ideology. Jihad 
remains justified, but returning FTFs believe its means of conduct in Somalia to be wrong. 
 
Perspective Taking  
 Restoring life embeddedness requires the individual to both develop an understanding 
for their own wants and needs as well as those of others. The perspective taking entails 
developing empathy, ability to perceive not verbally expressed signals from the surroundings 
and understanding for societal structures (Bertelsen, 2015; 2016). 
Returnees interviewed reflect on their wants and needs and those of their fellow 
returnees, but do not consider the wants and needs of the receiving communities. Returning 
FTFs long for acceptance while wanting to feel taken care of and cared for, and their advice 
for conduct of practices is directed towards the communities. 
Much in the communities’ reception of a returning FTF is not verbally expressed to 
the returnee. Fear is not articulated, yet understood by all returnees. This portrays an ability to 
sense not verbally expressed signals. However, few returnees reflect on their own individual 
association to what contributes to the fear sensed. Parallels are drawn between community 
perception and how FTFs are received, but fatalities and the caused suffering to victims of 
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terror, through abuse, torture and murder, is not internalized despite having previously 
identified with Al Shabaab. An interviewee elaborates on how fear disables reintegration and 
believes there is a need for mutual kindness and care, acknowledges the difficulties 
experienced by the communities but believes the outcome would justify the lowering of their 
guard. Furthermore, ability to reflect on individual responsibility in the reintegration process 
is expressed by some who translate this into practicing perspective taking, i.e. doing (R1; R6; 
R7; R9).  
Possibility to perspective taking is enabled by being exposed to other views. 
Segregation among majority of the FTFs and their communities prevents this, which makes 
evident that perceptions and beliefs are subjectively attributed by returnees to the 
communities and vice versa. The assumption that all non-Muslims perceive Muslims as 
terrorists is generalized by an interviewee, which indicates he has not been exposed to other 
perspectives in order to challenge the held belief. It is important to note that returnees mainly 
interact with other returnees and civil society actors who have arguably chosen to work with 
reintegration initiatives because they believe in reintegration and its importance. Hence, 
returning FTFs are initially being met by individuals with the resulting biased sentiment 
which is not shared by all actors. Some, more prejudice, actors alternatively believe in a 
security oriented hard approach in engaging with returning FTFs. Returnees might not be 
directly exposed to interaction with actors upholding the later beliefs, nor with victims of 
terror or articulated needs of receiving community members, which explains their assessment 
of their surrounding environment. 
In conclusion, it can be argued that the FTF perspective taking is exercised to the 
extent that they want their immediate surrounding to understand them, in order to provide 
comfort and care. This is challenged by pre-formed expectations by retuning FTFs and 
community members alike; the former in how they expect to be received and the latter in how 
they expect the returnee to behave. Some community actors are willing to assist FTFs in 
reintegration if they meet a set of commonly understood and formulated criteria, which does 
not seem to be clearly communicated to the returnees. Further confusion is caused by the lack 
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of a coherent approach in reintegration initiatives, which inhibits ability to form a 
comprehensive image of the others’ perspectives. 
 
Beyond Life Embeddedness 
Moving beyond the analytical framework of Life Psychology, additional challenges 
emerge to pose limitations to the theoretical framework and the abductive approach of this 
study allows suggestions for refining the framework regarding issues of trust, societal 
structures and the concept of attunement. 
 
Developing Trust 
All interviewees; returning FTFs, stakeholders and actors, highlight that developing a 
sense of trust is crucial for reintegration. Trust is seen as essential in order for returning FTFs 
to commit to the reintegration process and lack of trust is described as a reason for failing, 
leaving or abandoning the process. Majority of the returnees’ trust only a few genuine actors, 
religious leaders and members of immediate family. This is verified and acknowledged by all 
stakeholders interviewed. Actors indicate that official leadership and elected leaders on 
county level are trusted by returning FTFs. This is not confirmed by the responding returning 
FTFs in this study, but elaborated on by actors who have engaged with other returnees. It is 
implied that exercising agency through electing local leaders works to enhance a feeling of 
trust. Nevertheless, developing trust is portrayed as an important component in reintegration, 
and a few interviewees elaborate on the importance of trust. R9 indicates it has given her a 
sense of fulfillment which is described valuable, and R1 encourages receiving communities to 
trust returnees; seen to be the only way to make reintegration possible. 
Trust can be argued to be a moderating factor for how an individual will chose to use 
skills developed to address challenges and tasks presented by life. Low levels of trust 
undermine reintegration, whereas reliance, truth and confidence would be inducive for 
reintegration. Incorporating the component of trust as a moderating factor, among want, 
ability, doing, possibilities and being met in the Life Psychology framework, would arguably 
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enhance understanding for participation, attunement and perspective taking. This, in turn, 
would enhance understanding for the concept of life embeddedness and what is inducive for 
its state of flow. 
 
Developing Structures 
The study makes evident that the absence of societal structures to legally facilitate 
reintegration of returning FTFs is a cause of major concern. Structures are not addressed in 
the Life Psychology framework, but highlighted as crucial by actors as well as returning 
FTFs. Actors call for legal guidelines for how to engage with returnees, and the inability to 
create legitimacy is attributed to the lack of legal framework, which some actors lobby for in 
Parliament and on local level. In the meantime, the consequences of this is that not all 
returning FTFs to Kwale enroll in the amnesty programmes, as their security is not 
guaranteed. Many fear being harassed or killed by security officials or other FTFs who do not 
intend to reintegrate. The latter group illustrates why efforts for successfully motivating 
reintegration is crucial, as some returnees’ intentions are unknown which poses a severe 
security risk. This could be addressed through official structures. Furthermore, due to the 
missing framework, the returnees are unable to form realistic expectations. Hence, both 
returnees and actors reflect on how structure and frameworks are missing.  
Without the confidence in structures, legitimacy is inhibited, which is not accounted 
for in the Life Psychology framework. The framework addresses the individual need to 
develop an understanding for existing structures and systems, but if a legal structure is non-
existent, assessments evolve around illegitimate structures which do not address reality. 
Hence, it can be argued that flow in life embeddedness, as accounted for in the Life 
Psychology framework, demands legitimate structures, making the framework not applicable 
in environments with a weak social security structure where more pragmatic approaches are 
evidently necessary. 
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Developing Concept of Attunement 
The concept of attunement emerges as a weakness in the Life Psychology framework, 
which demands further attention. 4 of the interviewed returning FTFs (R1; R4; R6; R7) 
indicate moderate to high flow in life embeddedness through community participation, 
attunement and perspective taking, which are assumed as preconditions for reintegration. Yet, 
they indicate radical sentiments and willingness to rejoin Al Shabaab if insecurity in Kwale 
persists, or if jihad is declared by a religious leader. 
It is important to note that the baseline norm is constituted and created by the majority 
norm in any given society, and radicalized views justifying violent extremism represent a 
minority in many societies. Requiring attunement of minority norms and believes to fit those 
of the majority can arguably by returning FTFs be perceived as marginalizing, but 
nevertheless required for deradicalization in order to reintegrate. However, attunement as part 
of reintegration in parts of Kwale might not require deradicalization, in contrast to what is 
assumed in the Life Psychology framework. This could be argued to be the case for the 
radical FTFs interviewed, who reintegrate in a community which does not require attunement, 
as the radical sentiments held by the returning individual are shared by the majority of the 
community but where only some are triggered to violent radical activism. This indicates that 
one can be actively committed to the reintegration process without deradicalizing, which 
contradicts what is assumed in the Life Psychology framework. Hence, the Life Psychology 
framework does not seem to be applicable in a setting where FTFs return to an environment 
enclosing radical beliefs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The objective of the study is to increase understanding for why a sustained reintegration 
process is experienced and committed to by reintegrating FTFs, and how associated 
challenges are addressed. The global increase in number of returning FTFs from violent 
extremist and terror organizations stresses the urgency of developing strategies to avert 
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potential security threats and address the reintegration imperative. Arguably, the process is 
best informed by accounts from the returning FTFs themselves, which are accounts called for 
in the CVE discourse as many have returned to their county of origin and many more will 
follow. 
The study finds that returning FTFs in Kwale are committed to the reintegration 
process primarily in the absence of other alternatives for rejoining their respective 
communities and to obtaining security. Secondarily, to receive care and compassion, majority 
of the FTFs turn to family and close community members, whose support and reconciliation 
encourages commitment to the reintegration process. The study finds that FTFs express a 
longing for societal acceptance and understanding, which they do little to address due to fear. 
Returning FTFs identify with other returnees, and display a commitment in supporting other 
returning FTFs in their reintegration process, while appreciate gaining the support in return. A 
strong incentive for commitment to the reintegration process, albeit debated among actors and 
practitioners, is the provision of economic incentives to encourage reintegration. 
The challenges that emerge, from the studied experiences in the reintegration process, 
provide answers to the second research question. The challenges on structural, communal and 
individual level in the reintegration process in Kwale are addressed by returnees in differing 
ways. Structural challenges are produced by the missing legal framework for facilitation of 
the process of reintegration, which poses a security threat to returning FTFs and anyone they 
associate with. These include extrajudicial killings by security officials and extremist or 
radical FTFs. Insecurity excludes returning FTFs from society and prevents developing trust. 
Communal marginalization and stigmatization inhibit returnees from accessing educational 
and employment opportunities, which makes some turn to dedicated civil society actors or 
community members for support and assistance in navigating their way in the reintegration 
process. As some turn to family members, who either reject or hide the returnee, communal 
reintegration is inhibited. Others turn to religious leaders, whom on occasion are perceived to 
promote radicalization. 
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It can be confirmed that establishing a sense of belonging to restore life embeddedness 
is not solely the returning FTFs’ responsibility since it requires the facilitation of 
communities. Due to this, the process of restoring life embeddedness is not to be seen as an 
isolated event solely undertaken by returnees. Both the returnees and members of the 
receiving societies are actively restoring a threatened life embeddedness; the former to 
reintegrate and the latter due to their participation, attunement and perspective taking 
challenged by the external security threat that has entered their communities. 
Implications of the study suggest development of the Life Psychology framework. 
This includes the incorporation of the notion of trust as a moderating factor in order to 
establish life embeddedness, as well as the acknowledging the importance in legitimacy 
produced by societal structures in which pragmatic strategies are needed. It is important to 
note that actors forming the social security network in the Aarhus model, components of 
which the Life Psychology uses as a justification for its generalizability, are legitimate civil 
society actors or officials engaged in the individualized, mentoring strategies with which 
returning FTFs are approached. The security structure within the Danish context could be 
attributed more resilience and legitimacy due to the strength of social security networks, in 
comparison to status, strength and resources of social security in the Kenyan context. 
Furthermore, the development of social security networks is inhibited in an environment of 
corruption and inequality. 
In relation to the Life Psychology framework, it can be concluded that the returning 
FTFs in Kwale portray experiencing possibilities to participate in their respective 
communities, even if so to varying degrees. However, inability to attune or take other 
perspectives into account, results in a state of non-flow in life embeddedness. Yet, many of 
the returning FTFs indicate that they are in fact reintegrating into their communities of origin, 
which challenges the concept of life embeddedness as an indicator for reintegration. 
The returning FTFs’ accounts presented have arguably highlighted the importance to 
more broadly and transnationally reach objectives encouraging this study; to advance 
understanding for experiences of returning FTFs reintegration process in order to strengthen 
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individual, societal and political will to implement and sustain strategies enabling these 
individuals to commit to a process of reintegration. This incorporates redefining our 
understanding of, and demand for, deradicalization, as it might not always be necessary, 
possible or even societally expected. 
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